Personal statement Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 42

Personal Statement Example Through wide reading about issues pertaining to human relations across different parts of the globe, I have come to realise that law is an indispensable component of our lives. In fact, it is an integral part of our lives. I am strongly convinced that societies could not be governable the absence of law. To that effect, different laws are promulgated by different nations in order to govern the conduct of human behaviour so that they do not transgress against the standard expectations with regard to how they should behave. However, law is one subject area that is often misunderstood by many people. Basically, law is designed for people and by people but it seems that many individuals often fail to interpret law correctly. As a result, their rights may be violated through ignorance of the law. Against this background, I have developed a keen interest in understanding and mastering different aspects of law particularly the concept of corporate law. This is a new dispensation in law and I would like to gain more knowledge and insight about it. Currently, I am a final year law student and I have a keen interest in pursuing my studies in the same area. After completion of my first degree, I would like to proceed to Masters Degree in corporate law from a reputable institution. I have been greatly inspired by the education system in England and I can proudly say that I would like to pursue my Masters Degree in law in this great country. I have been attracted to this country through numerous visits that my family and I have had from my early childhood. Along the years, I became familiar with its streets, buildings shops and the ideology of its people and how to deal with them. Moreover, I love the language, especially after attending an English school in my country. The UK is also known for its prestigious academics, having numerous universities ranking top in the world. I am convinced that the British curriculum is

Critical Discourse Analysis, Organizational Discourse, and Organizational Change Essay Example for Free

Critical Discourse Analysis, Organizational Discourse, and Organizational Change Essay Discourses is an element of all concrete social events (actions, processes) as well as of more durable social practices, though neither are simply discourse: they are articulations of discourse with non-discoursal elements. ‘Discourse’ subsumes language as well as other forms of semiosis such as visual images and ‘body language’, and the discoursal element of a social event often combines different semiotic forms (eg a television programme). But the use of the ‘term ‘discourse’ rather than ‘language’ is not purely or even primarily motivated by the diversity of forms of semiosis, it is primarily registers a relational way of seeing semiosis[i], as one element of social events and practices dialectically interconnected with other elements. The overriding objective of discourse analysis, on this view, is not simply analysis of discourse per se, but analysis of the dialectical relations between discourse and non-discoursal elements of the social, in order to reach a better understanding of these complex relations (including how changes in discourse can cause changes in other elements). But if we are to analyse relations between discourse and non-discoursal elements, we must obviously see them as ontologically (and not just epistemologically, analytically) different elements of the social. They are different, but they are not discrete – that is, they are dialectically related, in the sense that elements ‘internalize’ other elements, without being reducible to them (Harvey 1996, Chouliaraki Fairclough 1999, Fairclough 2003, Fairclough, Jessop Sayer 2004). A realist view of social life sees it as including social structures as well as social events – in critical realist terms, the ‘real’ (which defines and delimits what is possible) as well as the ‘actual’ (what actually happens). There is a general recognition that the relationship between structures and events must be a mediated relation, and I follow for instance Bhaskar (1986) and Bourdieu (Bourdieu Wacquant 1992) in regarding social practices as the mediating entities – more or less durable and stable articulations of diverse social elements including discourse which constitute social selections and orderings of the allowances of social structures as actualisable allowances in particular areas of social life in a certain time and place. Social fields, institutions and organizations can be regarded as networks of social practices. Networks of social practices include specifically discoursal selections and orderings (from languages and other semiotic systems, which are counted amongst social structures) which I call ‘orders of discourse’, appropriating but redefining Foucault’s term (Foucault 1984, Fairclough 1992). Orders of discourse are social structurings of linguistic/semiotic variation or difference. Realist discourse analysis on this view is based in a dialectical-relational social ontology which gives ontological priority to processes and relations over objects, entities, persons, organizations etc, yet sees the latter as socially produced ‘permanences’ (Harvey 1996) which constitute a pre-structured reality with which we are confronted, and sets of affordances and limitations on processes. Epistemological priority is given to neither pre-constructed social structures, practices, institutions, identities or organizations, nor to processes, actions, and events: the concern is with the relationship and tension between them. People with their capacities for agency are seen as socially produced, contingent and subject to change, yet real, and possessing real causal powers which, in their tension with the causal powers of social structures, are a focus for analysis. Social research proceeds through abstraction from the concrete events of social life aimed at understanding the pre-structured nature of social life, and returns to analysis of concrete events, actions and processes in the light of this abstract knowledge. Discourse and non-discoursal elements of social events and social practices are related in many ways. I distinguish three main ways: representing, acting (and interacting), and being. At the level of social practices, orders of discourse can be seen as articulations of specific ways of representing, acting, and being – ie specific discourses, genres and styles. A discourse is a particular way of representing certain parts or aspects of the (physical, social, psychological) world; a genre is a particular way of (inter)acting (which comprises the discoursal element of a way of inter)acting which will also necessarily comprise non-discoursal elements); a style is a way of being (the discoursal element of a way of being, an ‘identity’, which will also include non-discoursal elements). I shall use the term ‘text’[ii], in a generalized sense (not just written text but also spoken interaction, multi-semiotic televisual text etc) for the discoursal element of social events. Texts are doubly contextualized, first in their relation to other elements of social events, second in their relation to social practices, which is ‘internal’ to texts in the sense that they necessarily draw upon orders of discourse, ie social practices in their discoursal aspect, and the discourses, genres and styles associated with them. However, events (and therefore texts) are points of articulation and tension between two causal forces: social practices and, through their mediation, social structures; and the agency of the social actors who speak, write, compose, read, listen to, interpret them. The social ‘resource’ of discourses, genres and styles is subject to the transformative potential of social agency, so that texts do not simply instantiate discourses, genres and styles, they actively rework them, articulate them together in distinctive and potentially novel ways, hybridize them, transform them. My focus in this paper is on organizational change, and this version of CDA has indeed been developed in association with research on discourse in social change. Social change comprises change in social structures, social practices, the networking of social practices, and (the character of) social events; and change in languages and other semiotic systems, in orders of discourse and relations between orders of discourse, and in texts. With respect to orders of discourse, social change includes change in the social structuring of linguistic/semiotic variation, therefore change in discourses, genres and styles, and change in their articulation in orders of discourse, and change in relations between orders of discourse (eg political and media orders of discourse). With respect to texts, social change includes tendential change in how discourses, genres and styles are drawn upon and articulated/hybridized together in various types of text. The process of social change raises questions about causal relations between different elements. Causal relations are not simple or one-way. For instance, it would seem to make more sense to see new communication technologies (ICTs) as causing the emergence of new genres than vice-versa – changes in discourse caused by changes in non-discoursal elements. In other cases, change appears to be discourse-led. A pervasive contemporary process (for instance in processes of ‘transition’ in central and eastern Europe) is change initiated through the recontextualization[iii] in an organization, a social field, or a country of ‘external’ discourses, which may then be enacted in new ways of (inter)acting including new genres, inculcated as new ways of being including styles, and materialized in for example new ways of organizing space. These enactments, inculcations and materializations are dialectical processes. There is an important proviso however: these processes are contingent, they depend upon certain conditions of possibility. For instance, when a discourse is recontextualized, it enters a new field of social relations, and its trajectory within those social relations is decisive in determining whether or not it has (re)constructive effects on the organization, social field etc overall. In contexts of social change, different groups of social actors may develop different and conflicting strategies for change, which have a partially discursive character (narratives of the past, representations of the present, imaginaries for the future), and inclusion within a successful strategy is a condition for a discourse being dialectically enacted, inculcated and materialized in other social elements (Jessop 2002, Fairclough, Jessop Sayer 2004). Discourses construe aspects of the world in inherently selective and reductive ways, ‘translating’ and ‘condensing’ complex realities (Harvey 1996), and one always needs to ask, why this particular selection and reduction, why here, why now? (For a discussion of ‘globalisation’ discourse in these terms, see Fairclough Thomas forthcoming. Locating discourses in relation to strategies in contexts of social change enables us to connect particular representations of the world with particular interests and relations of power, as well assess their ideological import. Discourses do not emerge or become recontextualized in particular organizations or fields at random, and they do not stand in an arbitrary relation to social structures and practices, forms of institutionalization and organization. If we can construct explanations of change in non-discoursal elements of social reality which attribute causal effects to discourses, we can also construct explanations of change in discourses which attribute causal effects to (non-discoursal elements of) structures and practices, as well as social and strategic relations. The social construction of the social world may sometimes be a matter of changes in non-discoursal elements caused by discourses (through the concrete forms of texts), but discourses (and texts) are also causal effects, the dialectics of social change is not a one-way street. We can distinguish four elements, or moments, in the social trajectories of discourses: their emergence and constitution (through a re-articulation of existing elements); their entry into hegemonic struggles from which they may emerge as hegemonic discourses; their dissemination and recontextualization across structural and scalar boundaries (ie between one field or institution or organization and others, and between one scale (‘global’, macro-regional (eg the EU), national, local) and others; and their operationalization (enactment, inculcation, materialization). These are distinct moments with respect to the causal effects of discourses on non-discoursal (as well as discoursal, ie generic and stylistic) elements of social life, and they are all subject to non-discoursal as well as discoursal conditions. CDA claims that social research can be enriched by extending analysis of social processes and social change into detailed analysis of texts. More detailed (including linguistic) analysis of texts is connected to broader social analysis by way of (a) analysing texts as part of analysing social events, (b) interdiscursive analysis of shifting articulations of genres, discourses, styles in texts (Fairclough 2003). The latter locates the text as an element of a concrete event in its relationship to orders of discourse as the discoursal aspect of networks of social practices, and so allows the analyst to (a) assess the relationship and tension between the causal effects of agencies in the concrete event and the causal effects of (networks of) social practices, and through them of social structures (b) detect shifts in the relationship between orders of discourse and networks f social practices as these are registered in the interdiscursivity (mixing of genres, discourses, styles) of texts. Text can be seen as product and as process. Texts as products can be stored, retrieved, bought and sold, cited and summarized and so forth. Texts as processes can be grasped through seeing ‘texturing’, making texts, as a specific modality of social action, of social production or ‘making’ (of meanings, understandings, knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, social relations, social a nd personal identities, institutions, organizations). The focus is on ‘logogenesis’ (Iedema 2003:115-17), including the texturing of entities (objects, persons, spaces, organizations) which can, given certain preconditions, be dialectically internalized (enacted, inculcated and materialized) in non-discoursal elements of social life. See for instance the discussion of the significance of nominalization as a logogenetic process in texts in processes of organizing, producing organization objects, in Iedema (2003). Organizational Discourse  I shall construct my very selective comments on organizational discourse analysis around the following four themes: organization and organizing; variation, selection and retention; understandings of ‘discourse’; and intertextuality. Organization and organizing Mumby Stohl (1991) argue that researchers in organizational communication most centrally differ from those in other areas of organization studies in that the former problematize ‘organization’ whereas the latter do not. ‘For us, organization or organizing, to use Weicks (1979) term is a precarious, ambiguous, uncertain process that is continually being made and remade. In Weicks sense, organizations are only seen as stable, rational structures when viewed retrospectively. Communication, then, is the substance of organizing in the sense that through discursive practices organization members engage in the construction of a complex and diverse system of meanings’. Another formulation of this shift in emphasis from organizations as structures to ‘organizing’ (or ‘organizational becoming’, Tsoukas Chia 2002) as a process is that of Mumby Clair (1997: 181): ‘we suggest that organizations exist only in so far as their members create them through discourse. This is not to claim that organizations are â€Å"nothing but† discourse, but rather that discourse is the principal means by which organization members create a coherent social reality that frames their sense of who they are’. Despite the disclaimer at the beginning of the second sentence, this formulation can as argued by Reed (forthcoming) be seen as collapsing ontology into epistemology, and undermining the ontological reality of organizational structures as constraints on organizational action and communication. From the perspective of the realist view of discourse I have outlined, it makes little sense to see organizing and organization, or more generally agency and structure, as alternatives one has to choose between. With respect to organizational change, both organizational structures and the agency of members of organizations in organizational action and communication have causal effects on how organizations change. Organizational communication does indeed organize, produce organizational effects and transform organizations, but organizing is subject to conditions of possibility which include organizational structures. The paper by Iedema, Degeling, Braithwaite and White (2004) in the special issue of Organizational Studies is an analysis of how a ‘doctor-manager’ in a teaching hospital in Australia manages ‘the incommensurable dimensions’ of his ‘boundary position between profession and organization’ by positioning himself across different discourses, sometimes in a single utterance. The authors identify a heteroglossia ‘that is too context-regarding to be reducible to personal idiosyncracy, and too complex and dynamic to be the calculated outcome of conscious manipulation’. They see the doctor-manager’s talk as a ‘feat’ of ‘bricolage’, not as a display of ‘behaviours that are pre-programmed’. Nor is it an instantiation of a ‘strategy’, for ‘strategies are they assume ‘conscious’. Although the authors recognize that organizations can ‘set limits’ on what workers can say and do, impose ‘closure’, they see the doctor-manager as successfully ‘deferring closure on his own identity and on the discourses that realize it’. One can take this as an interesting and nuanced study of organization as the ‘organizing’ that is achieved in interaction (nuanced in the sense that it does not exclude organizational structures, though it does suggest that they are more ‘fluid’ and less ‘categorical’ than they have been taken to be, and it does recognize their capacity to impose ‘closure’). I would like to make a number of connected observations on this paper. First, one might see the doctor-manager’s ‘feat’ in this case as a particular form of a more general organizational process, the management of contradictions. Second, discourse figures differently in different types of organization (Borzeix 2003, referring to Girin 2001). The type of organization in this case seems to be in Girin’s terms a ‘cognitive’ (or ‘learning’, or ‘intelligent’) organization, in which the normative force of (written) texts (rules, procedures) is limited, and there is an emphasis on learning in spoken interaction. There seems to be, in other terms, a relatively ‘network’ type of structure rather than a simple hierarchy, where management involves a strong element participatory and consultative interaction with stakeholders. Third, connecting the first two points, spoken interaction in this type of organization accomplishes an ongoing management of contradictions which contrasts with the management of contradictions through suppressing them by imposing rules and procedures. Fourth, the doctor-manager’s ‘feat’ can be seen as a performance of a strategy as long as we abandon the (somewhat implausible) claim that all aspects and levels of strategic action are conscious – the doctor-manager would one imagines be conscious of the need to sustain a balancing act between professional and managerial perspectives and priorities, and of certain specific means to do so, but that does not entail him being conscious of all the complex interactive means he uses to do it. Fifth, while particular performances of this strategy (or, indeed, any strategy) are not ‘pre-programmed’, the strategy is institutionalized, disseminated, learnt, and constitutes a facet of the type of organization as a network of social practices, ie a facet of organizational structure. Sixth, it strikes me that bringing off a sense of creative bricolage is perhaps itself a part of the managerial style of this type of organization, ie part of the strategy, the network of social practices, the order of discourse. My conclusion is that even in a case of this sort, rather more emphasis is needed on the relationship between organizing and organization, performance and practice, ‘feat’ and strategy[iv]. Organizational discourse studies have been associated with postmodernist positions (Chia 1995, Grant, Harvey, Oswick Putnam forthcoming, Grant, Keenoy, Oswick 2001), though the field as a whole is too diverse to be seen as simply postmodernist. Chia identifies a postmodern ‘style of thinking’ in organizational studies which ‘accentuates the significance, ontological priority and analysis of the micro-logics of social organizing practices over and above their stabilized effects such as individuals. As this indicates, the focus on organizing rather than organisation is strongly associated with this ‘style of thinking’. Like the dialectical-relational ontology I advocated earlier, this ‘style of thinking’ sees objects and entities as produced within ontologically prior processes. The key difference is that this ‘style of thinking’ tends towards a one-sided emphasis on process, whereas the realist view of discourse analysis I have been advocating centres upon the tension between (discoursal) process and pre-structured (discoursal and linguistic, as well as non-discoursal) objects. This form of realism is not subject to the tendency within modernist social research which is criticized by Woolgar (1988) to take the objects it arrives at through abstraction (which would include in the case of CDA orders of discourse, as well as language and other semiotic systems) to be exhaustive of the social reality it researches. The key difference in this case is whereas this form of modernist research moves from the concrete to the abstract and then ‘forgets’ the concrete, the dialectic-relational form of realism I have advocated crucially makes the move back to analysis of the concrete. CDA is not merely concerned with languages and orders of discourse, it is equally concerned with text and texturing, and with the relations of tension between the two.

Physics of Rock Climbing :: physics sport sports rock climbing

When thinking of rock climbing it is good to think of all aspects of climbing in terms of energy. While thinking of energy, remember basic geology and know that not all rocks are formed in the same way, in other words know what type of rock you are dealing with, it is good to think of the process of formation behind the type of rock you may be climbing. Understanding the formation process will drastically change the climbing technique used to climb that particular rock. Another aspect of energy that one should keep in mind is drastically changing your potential energy. Typically people climb along a vertical direction and move off of the surface of the earth using the rock to help them defy gravity. This can be an exhilarating experience, using ones own body to absorb the energy of the rock and change their potential energy. And last but not least not every human can undergo this change in energy without fall protection, because it is very probable that a foot may slip or a han d hold might come loose , a person will fall, and of course a rope is a spring when dealing with falling. Volcanic rocks provide a very easy climb, with lots of big pockets and foot placement for a begging climber. Usually these rocks have a very high friction coefficient making them seem easy to "stick" to. This young lad, is pressing the rock with his hands not really using a hold, instead using more friction. Here is an example of a rock made from harder material, with a lower friction coefficient, making the climbing a little more difficult, causing the climber to rely more on hand strength, rather than friction to move up the rock. This rock type is very popular among climbers today. This man is climbing using an open handed grip with his right hand ensuring him the most positive force on bigger holds. And last is sandstone, which is considered the most dangerous rock type to climb, due to low friction and easy to break. As you can see the this climber has the least amount of hand holds causing this climbers techinique to change in hand holds, she is using a closed grip with her hands ensuring the most positive force her fingers can exert on the rock. Those are not the only type of rock Physics of Rock Climbing :: physics sport sports rock climbing When thinking of rock climbing it is good to think of all aspects of climbing in terms of energy. While thinking of energy, remember basic geology and know that not all rocks are formed in the same way, in other words know what type of rock you are dealing with, it is good to think of the process of formation behind the type of rock you may be climbing. Understanding the formation process will drastically change the climbing technique used to climb that particular rock. Another aspect of energy that one should keep in mind is drastically changing your potential energy. Typically people climb along a vertical direction and move off of the surface of the earth using the rock to help them defy gravity. This can be an exhilarating experience, using ones own body to absorb the energy of the rock and change their potential energy. And last but not least not every human can undergo this change in energy without fall protection, because it is very probable that a foot may slip or a han d hold might come loose , a person will fall, and of course a rope is a spring when dealing with falling. Volcanic rocks provide a very easy climb, with lots of big pockets and foot placement for a begging climber. Usually these rocks have a very high friction coefficient making them seem easy to "stick" to. This young lad, is pressing the rock with his hands not really using a hold, instead using more friction. Here is an example of a rock made from harder material, with a lower friction coefficient, making the climbing a little more difficult, causing the climber to rely more on hand strength, rather than friction to move up the rock. This rock type is very popular among climbers today. This man is climbing using an open handed grip with his right hand ensuring him the most positive force on bigger holds. And last is sandstone, which is considered the most dangerous rock type to climb, due to low friction and easy to break. As you can see the this climber has the least amount of hand holds causing this climbers techinique to change in hand holds, she is using a closed grip with her hands ensuring the most positive force her fingers can exert on the rock. Those are not the only type of rock

Application of Forensic Psychology within a trial: R vs. Golds

Introduction Before delving into the applications and relevant theories in Forensic Psychology in this case, it is first necessary to summarise the particulars of this case. This will allow for the evidence to be objectively assessed, and then broken down as the empirical evidence provided by the field of Forensic Psychology pertains to specific points. This will allow for the value of various aspects of the evidence on both sides to be assessed, which may result in a re-evaluation of the overall verdict. The psychological evidence will then be evaluated within the relevant theoretical framework, and these theories will in turn be critically analysed so that the degree to which the relevant findings and theories of forensic psychology can be used to interpret the meaning and weight of evidence in this case can be evaluated. The defendant was convicted of murdering his wife, but appealed against conviction on the grounds that he was suffering from a mental illness and therefore was impaired substa ntially enough to meet the criteria for manslaughter, not murder. The appeal was dismissed. Although the defendant admitted killing his wife he did not give evidence at the trial, stating that he was not in a fit mental state. A voir dire by a medical expert, B, attested to the fact that the defendant ought not to give evidence due to his mental state, and when recounting this to the jury the judge ruled that no adverse inference should be drawn from this. The judge did however not allow evidence from B to be given at the trial. The evidence in support of the defence was given by three expert medical witnesses all attesting to the deteriorating mental state of the defence and that the criteria for diminished responsibility were satisfied. No medical testimony disputed this. Evidence admitted by the judge against the defence came from the defendant’s daughter, S, who recounted a conversation in which the defendant admitted assaulting the victim on a prior occasion. This was ta ken as evidence of the defendant’s bad character. During the trial there was some discussion of the definition of the term ‘substantially impaired’; the defence counsel defined the term as anything ‘more than trivial[ly impaired]’ but the judge refused this definition and declined to give the jury any further guidance as to the legal definition of this term. A verdict of manslaughter would suggest that the defendant was not able to fully understand the nature of what he was doing, make a rational decision and exercise self-control (Morse, 2003). Of course the legal definition of ‘substantially impaired’ is also relevant; as it is defined by the English Homicide Act (1957) substantial impairment is constituted either by a ‘common sense’ standard or by any degree of impairment which is more than trivial but less than total (Prevezer, 1957). Whether the defendant reaches the threshold for these definitions of substantially impa ired will decide whether he is convicted of manslaughter or murder. One issue raised by the defendant in the appeal was that although the judge did explicitly state that the jury was not to draw any condemning inference from the defendant’s lack of testimony, he failed to remind the jury that S’s evidence should be considered with caution, because the defendant was not able to give any account of the alleged conversation. According to the literature in forensic psychology there could be valid grounds to this claim, however the claim itself could also be redundant entirely. This is because jurors do indeed evidently find it difficult to evaluate the weight of evidence and draw inferences appropriately (Thomas and Hogue, 1976). Thomas and Hogue (1976) developed a decision-making model for jurors, showing broadly that the weight jurors will ascribe to evidence varies across the population according to a variety of factors relevant to the characteristics of the jury. In th is model the decision threshold which defines whether the jury votes for the plaintiff or defendant varies little across the population but may vary between cases and be affected by factors such as instructions to jurors. This latter point is very important because it addresses the effect that instructions to the jury can have, even a small effect could have made a substantial difference to the way the jury regarded evidence. Evidence suggests that this is particularly the case with emotionally-charged evidence which is pertinent to this case, Cush and Delahunty (2006) found that mock jurors who received no pre-evidence instructions to consider emotionally evocative evidence (gruesome photographs) dispassionately or with caution gave more verdicts in favour of the victim and scored higher on measures of victim compassion and crime negativity than did jurors who did receive such instruction. Embedded within cognitive theory this evidence supports the defendant’s position on th is point; without all of the pertinent evidence with the appropriate weights the juror as a sense-making machine would not be able to reach an informed decision (Pennington and Hastie, 1991). The heuristics and biases approach (Griffin, Gonzalez and Varey, 2001) views decision-making, thought and perception as vulnerable to various cognitive biases and distortions from mental archetypes. One such source of bias has been dubbed ‘WYSIATI’, or ‘what you see is all there is’. This notion is important in a forensic context because the jury will naturally find it difficult to take into account evidence that is not readily presented to them (Neal and Grisso, 2014) especially when presented with material evidence which contradicts it. Another point to consider is the value of S’s evidence; factors which may be important to consider are the age of the witness (Ceci, Ross and Toglia, 1987), the power of hindsight and the nature of reconstructive memory (Leippe , 1980). According to a retrieval theory of memory, recognition and recall styles of memory are possible through a resonance-style spreading-activation pattern of retrieval attempts (Ratcliff, 1978). When a search of memory in this way is performed, certain archetypes or contextual information and assumptions about the objects in memory may fill in gaps or add meaning; depending on the age of the witness this may be even more important, because young children are more susceptible to such biases (Ceci, Ross and Toglia, 1987; Leippe, 1980). There may have been subtleties in the alleged conversation with the defendant which would reinterpret the meaning, especially in light of the defendant’s alleged mental illness which S could have missed in her memory of the conversation. Even if the judge had instructed the jury to treat S’s evidence with caution though, the question is what effect would this have had on the verdict. The answer would seem to be that even though it may have changed the jury’s perception of the evidence (Cush and Delahunty, 2006), this would not have substantially affected the verdict because the evidence of S was of limited significance in the first place because of the strength of other evidence that the defendant had abused the victim. A cognitive decision-makin framework would see people evaluating this evidence overall in favour of the victim (Pennington and Hastie, 1991). In addition to this it was made clear to the jury that the case of the defendant was that he had not abused the victim. This makes it a somewhat trivial point in the overall case. Cognitive theory is useful in the context of forensic psychology because it provides a framework for the decision-making process to be understood, and an opportunity for the value of evidence to be quantified. The theory does view human beings as rational agents who are able to objectively consider evidence, simply adding additional weight to emotional evidence. This could be seen as reductionist as it ignores a wealth of human experience and much of the cultural meaning inherent in cases such as this one. The spreading-activation theory of memory also has its opponents. Some memory researchers prefer to view memory errors as arising from consolidation or encoding errors (Squire and Alvarez, 1995). Both are useful in a forensic psychology context but it is important to remember that the evidence is interpreted theoretically, and there must still be a weight assigned to evidence based on theory. It must therefore be acknowledged that the interpretation of evidence is at least somewhat arbitrary based on these theories. A second point in the appeal was that the judge was supposedly wrong to not allow the evidence of B to go before the jury. The value of expert witnesses is debateable in the literature, assuming that their professional opinions within their fields are valid and reliable, the problem arises with the effect their testimony has on the jury. Expert testimony usually affects the credence that the jury gives to the testimony or stance of the individuals being evaluated, and in this case the evidence of B may well have contributed to the judge’s decision to instruct the jury to draw no condemning inference from the defendant’s lack of testimony. Due to certain cognitive biases, the message an expert tries to convey may not be received by the jury as intended, which may vindicate the judge’s decision to not allow B’s testimony. Jury members will often ascribe disproportionate impact to expert testimony (Krafka, Dunn, Johnson, Cecil et al., 2002), meaning the intended message is exaggerated or otherwise distorted resulting in jurors who may believe something contrary to what the literature on mental illness suggests. B had stated that the defendant was not in a fit state to give testimony, and attested to the reality of his mental illness and deteriorating mental state despite the usage of antips ychotic medication. This last point may be of particular importance because members of the general public may not have a full understanding of the research into the effects of antipsychotics (Jorm, Korten, Rodgers, Pollitt et al., 1997) which B presumably did have. If the jury believed that antipsychotics could cure the defendant’s mental illness then this could lead to them drawing a condemning inference. The weight that B’s evidence would have had is in question though because of the already substantial amount of evidence in support of the existence and chronic worsening of the defendant’s mental illness. This is an issue because if the jury was already convinced that the defendant was indeed mentally ill at the time of the killing and still voted to convict the defendant of murder then the impact B’s evidence may have had is a moot point. The only remaining question is whether B’s testimony would have added anything to the testimony of the other experts due to the voir dire examination. It does seem unlikely that the testimony of B would have differed significantly from the other experts, and due to the evidence suggesting that the individual persuasive ability of experts has more of an impact on jurors than the content of their message (Bank and Poythress, 1982) the judge was probably right to not allow the additional expert testimony. A criticism of most of this research is that it mostly uses mock jurors, and also the mock cases obviously involved different experts and circumstances to the one in question. This means that the effect may be more or less pronounced in this scenario, but the evidence is from a very relevant context and is extremely likely to still be useful. The only potential problem lies in the participants not taking the mock case as seriously as they would a real case. The general population may not have a good understanding of mental illness or mental capacity as these terms are defined in legal disco urse (Jorm, 2000) which did necessitate at least some expert testimony. Another point is that the judge did not give any contrasting definition for the term ‘substantially impaired’ when the defence counsel offered the definition of ‘anything impairment more than trivial’. Although this was submitted as grounds for appeal, the evidence suggests that if anything this point would have resulted in the jurors adopting a standard of impairment that was too liberal by legal standards. This is because jurors and indeed people in general are not as able to disregard presented information as readily as most people believe (Lieberman and Arndt, 2000). According to theories in social psychology, hindsight bias and belief perseverance can lead to jurors actually relying on inadmissible evidence more than other evidence (Lieberman and Arndt, 2000). This is very useful research in this context because it highlights the importance of presented information; the definition offered by the defence counsel will be given inappropriate attention. Since the verdict was still to convict, this suggests strongly that the court was right to dismiss the appeal. In light of the strength of the evidence and theory reviewed and the applications in this case, it is clear that the second and third points submitted by the defendant in the appeal were properly rebuffed by the judge, in fact the evidence suggests that these issues would have worked in the defendant’s favour if the judge had responded differently. As for the first point, it appears from the research that any effect on jury perception would be negligible, although there is some conflict in the literature as to the effect of instructions of limitation from the judge. References Morse, S. J. (2003). Diminished rationality, diminished responsibility. Ohio St. J. Crim. L., 1, 289. Prevezer, S. (1957). The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder. Columbia Law Review, 624-652. Thomas, E. A., & Hogue, A. (1976). Apparent weight of evidence, decision criteria, and confidence ratings in juror decision making. Psychological Review,83(6), 442. Cush, R. K., & Delahunty, J. G. (2006). The influence of limiting instructions on processing and judgments of emotionally evocative evidence. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 13(1), 110-123. Griffin, D., Gonzalez, R., & Varey, C. (2001). The heuristics and biases approach to judgment under uncertainty. Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Intraindividual processes, 1, 207-235. Neal, T., & Grisso, T. (2014). The cognitive underpinnings of bias in forensic mental health evaluations. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 20(2), 200. Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1991). Cognitive theory of juror decision ma king: The story model, A. Cardozo L. Rev., 13, 519. Ceci, S. J., Ross, D. F., & Toglia, M. P. (1987). Suggestibility of children’s memory: Psycholegal implications. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 116(1), 38. Leippe, M. R. (1980). Effects of integrative memorial and cognitive processes on the correspondence of eyewitness accuracy and confidence. Law and Human behavior, 4(4), 261. Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological review, 85(2), 59. Alba, J. W., & Hasher, L. (1983). Is memory schematic?. Psychological Bulletin, 93(2), 203. Bank, S. C., & Poythress Jr, N. G. (1982). Elements of Persuasion in Expert Testimony, The. J. Psychiatry & L., 10, 173. Jorm, A. F. (2000). Mental health literacy Public knowledge and beliefs about mental disorders. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 177(5), 396-401. Lieberman, J. D., & Arndt, J. (2000). Understanding the limits of limiting instructions: Social psychological explanations for the failures of instru ctions to disregard pretrial publicity and other inadmissible evidence. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 6(3), 677. Squire, L. R., & Alvarez, P. (1995). Retrograde amnesia and memory consolidation: a neurobiological perspective. Current opinion in neurobiology,5(2), 169-177. Jorm, A. F., Korten, A. E., Rodgers, B., Pollitt, P., Jacomb, P. A., Christensen, H., & Jiao, Z. (1997). Belief systems of the general public concerning the appropriate treatments for mental disorders. Social psychiatry and psychiatric epidemiology, 32(8), 468-473.

Balance Scorecard Essay

Develop the strategic objectives for your business in the format of a balanced scorecard. The strategic objectives are measures of attaining your vision and mission. As you develop them consider the vision, mission, and values for your business and the outcomes of your SWOTT analysis. Consider the following four quadrants of the balanced scorecard when developing your strategic objectives: Shareholder Value or Financial Perspective, includes strategic objectives in areas such as: Market share Revenues and costs Profitability Competitive position Customer Value Perspective, includes strategic objectives in areas such as: Customer retention or turnover Customer satisfaction Customer value Process or Internal Operations Perspective, includes strategic objectives in areas such as: Measure of process performance Productivity or productivity improvement Operations metrics Learning and Growth (Employee) Perspective, includes strategic objectives in areas such as: Employee satisfaction Employee turnover or retention Level of organizational capability Nature of organizational culture or climate Technological innovation Develop at least two strategic objectives for each of the following four balanced scorecard areas identified above (Financial, Customer, Process, Learning and Growth). Your objectives should be selected, in part, based on an evaluation of a number of potential alternatives to the issues and/or opportunities identified in the SWOTT Analysis paper and table you completed in Week Three. Base your solutions on a ranking of alternative solutions that i†¦ Get complete A+ tutorial here – https://bitly.com/12C4Fhk If you have a hard time with schedules, try using routines. Schedules generally involve plans that are timed, while routines are generally habitual procedures. If scheduling doesn’t work for you, try implementing a routine with basic guidelines. They don’t need to be done in a particular order or at specific times, but they can be used to make a list for completing your daily tasks. Business – Management Individual Strategic Plan, Part III: Balanced Scorecard Resource: Exhibit 7-1 in Ch. 7 of Strategic Management Develop the strategic objectives for your business in the format of a  balanced scorecard. The strategic objectives are measures of attaining your vision and mission. As you develop them consider the vision, mission, and values for your business and the outcomes of your SWOTT analysis. Consider the following four quadrants of the balanced scorecard when developing your strategic objectives:  · Shareholder Value or Financial Perspective, includes strategic objectives in areas such as:   Market share   Revenues and costs   Profitability   Competitive position  · Customer Value Perspective, includes strategic objectives in areas such as:   Customer retention or turnover   Customer satisfaction   Customer value  · Process or Internal Operations Perspective, includes strategic objectives in areas such as:   Measure of process performance   Productivity or productivity improvement   Operations metrics  · Learning and Growth (Employee) Perspective, includes strategic objectives in areas such as:   Employee satisfaction   Employee turnover or retention   Level of organizational capability   Nature of organizational culture or climate   Technological innovation Develop at least three strategic objectives for each of the following four balanced scorecard areas identified above (Financial, Customer, Process, Learning and Growth). Your objectives should be selected, in part, based on an evaluation of a number of potential alternatives to the issues and/or opportunities identified in the SWOTT Analysis paper and table you completed in Week Three. Base your solutions on a ranking of alternative solutions that includes an identification of potential risks and mitigation plans, and a stakeholder analysis that includes†¦